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THE PATHOLOGIES OF DIGITAL CONSENT
NEIL RICHARDS* AND WOODROW HARTZOG**
ABSTRACT
Consent permeates both our law and our lives—particularly in the
digital context. Consent is the foundation of the relationships we have with
search engines, social networks, commercial web sites, and any one of the
dozens of other digitally mediated businesses we interact with regularly. We
are frequently asked to consent to terms of service, privacy notices, the use
of cookies, and so many other commercial practices. Consent is important,
but it’s possible to have too much of a good thing. As scholars have
documented, while consent models permeate the digital consumer
landscape, the practical conditions of these agreements fall far short of the
gold standard of knowing and voluntary consent. Yet as scholars,
advocates, and consumers, we lack a common vocabulary for talking about
the different ways in which digital consents can be flawed.
This article offers four contributions to improve our understanding of
consent in the digital world. First, we offer a conceptual vocabulary of “the
pathologies of consent”—a framework for talking about different kinds of
defects that consent models can suffer, including unwitting consent, coerced
consent, and incapacitated consent. Second, we offer three conditions for
when consent will be most valid in the digital context: when choice is
infrequent, when the potential harms resulting from that choice are vivid
and easy to imagine, and where we have the correct incentives choose
consciously and seriously. The further we fall from these conditions, we
argue, the more a particular consent will be pathological and thus suspect.
Third, we argue that our theory of consent pathologies sheds light on the
so-called “privacy paradox”—the notion that there is a gap between what
consumers say about wanting privacy and what they actually do in practice.
Understanding the “privacy paradox” in terms of consent pathologies
shows how consumers are not hypocrites who say one thing but do another.
On the contrary, the pathologies of consent reveal how consumers can be
nudged and manipulated by powerful companies against their actual
interests, and that this process is easier when consumer protection law falls
*
Koch Distinguished Professor of Law & Director, Cordell Institute, Washington University.
**
Professor of Law and Computer Science, Northeastern University. For helpful comments on
prior drafts and discussions on this topic, we would both like to thank Scott Baker, Danielle Citron, Jon
Heusel, Jonathan King, and Katie Shilton. We would particularly like to thank Ari Waldman for his
partnership in the conference that led to this paper, to Rachel Mance for her outstanding work in planning
and running the conference, and to Luis Fernandez and Siri Nelson for their excellent research assistance.

1461

1462

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 96:1461

far from the gold standard. In light of these findings, we offer a fourth
contribution—the theory of consumer trust we have suggested in prior work
and which we further elaborate here as an alternative to an over-reliance
on increasingly pathological models of consent.
INTRODUCTION
Consent permeates our law. It is one of its most powerful and most
important building blocks. This should be no wonder. We live in a society
that lionizes individual choice in the many social roles we play every day,
whether as consumers, citizens, family members, voters, lovers, or
employees. Consent reinforces fundamental cultural notions of autonomy
and choice. It transforms the moral landscape between people and makes
the otherwise impossible possible.1 It is essential to the exercise (and
waiver) of fundamental constitutional rights, and it is at the essence of
political freedom, whether we are talking broadly about a “social contract”
or making political choices for individual candidates and referenda in the
voting booth.
Consider the substantial amount of legal work that consent performs. It
is the basis of contracts, whether for goods, services, real estate, or marriage.
The consent of the governed is the basis for the rule of law in democratic
societies and was an important basis for the American Revolution. Consent
can also work magic. When consent is present, trespassers can become
dinner guests, a battery can become a welcome pat on the back, and even
what would otherwise be a sexual assault can become an act of intimacy.2
Consent’s power, its usefulness, and its resonance with norms of
autonomy and choice make it an easy legal tool to reach for when we want
to regulate behavior. Just as activities that have no harm might warrant
lesser (or no) regulation, what consenting adults choose to do together takes
that activity presumptively beyond the law’s regulatory power. This is true
whether the activity happens in the open or behind the proverbial closed
doors. Consent’s power is particularly justified in cases of what we might
1.
For a more developed history of consent for data practices and contemplation of its role, see
NANCY KIM, CONSENTABILITY: CONSENT AND ITS LIMITS (2019); Elizabeth Edenberg & Meg Leta
Jones, Analyzing the Legal Roots and Moral Core of Digital Consent, 21 NEW MEDIA & SOC’Y 1804
(2019); Meg Leta Jones, The Development of Consent to Computing, 2019 IEEE ANNALS OF THE
HISTORY OF COMPUTING (forthcoming).
2.
Edenberg & Jones, supra note 1, at 1804–05 (“Valid consent can render permissible an
otherwise impermissible action. It transforms the specific relations between the consenter and consentee
about a clearly defined action. We can consent to sexual relations, borrowing a car, surgery, and the use
of personal information. Without consent, the same actions can become sexual assault, theft, battery,
and an invasion of privacy.”).
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call “gold standard” consent—agreements between parties who have equal
bargaining power, significant resources, and who knowingly and voluntarily
agree to assume contractual or other legal obligations.
Perhaps nowhere has consent been deployed more frequently as a legal
concept than in the context of digital goods and services. Consent is the
foundation of the relationships we have with search engines, social
networks, commercial web sites, and any one of the dozens of other digitally
mediated businesses we interact with regularly. We are frequently asked to
consent to terms of service, privacy notices, the use of tracking cookies, and
so many other commercial practices. But it’s possible to have too much of
a good thing. As we and other privacy law scholars have documented
elsewhere, while consent models permeate the digital consumer landscape,
the practical conditions of these agreements fall far short of the gold
standard.3 Think about your own agreements with the social networks you
use, the apps you install on your phone, or the Amazon Alexa that might sit,
listening, in your kitchen or bedroom. Do you know what you agreed to?
Have you read the agreements? Did you have a meaningful choice? While
the answer to these questions is usually “no,” the dominant legal regime that
applies in the United States is that the terms and conditions of these services
are valid as long as there is some kind of “notice and choice” to consumers.4
In practice, and as enforced with occasional exception by the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC), notice-and-choice models can be legally sufficient
even if the notice is buried somewhere in a dense privacy policy, and the
choice is take-it-or-leave-it—accept what a company wants to do with your
data or not use the service at all.5

3.
See, e.g., NANCY KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS (2013) [hereinafter KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS];
MARGARET RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW
(2012); Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Privacy's Trust Gap, 126 YALE L.J. 1180 (2017)
[hereinafter Richards & Hartzog, Privacy’s Trust Gap]; Neil Richards & Woodrow Hartzog, Taking
Trust Seriously in Privacy Law, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 431 (2016) [hereinafter Richards & Hartzog,
Taking Trust Seriously]; Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126
HARV. L. REV. 1880 (2013); Andrea M. Matwyshyn, Technoconsen(t)sus, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 529
(2007); Scott Peppet, Unraveling Privacy: The Personal Prospectus & the Threat of a Full Disclosure
Future, 105 NW. L. REV. 1153 (2011); Scott Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps
Toward Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security & Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85 (2014).
4.
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE:
A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR BUSINESSES AND POLICYMAKERS iii (2010); Woodrow Hartzog, The
New Price to Play: Are Passive Online Media Users Bound by Terms of Use?, 15 COMM. L. & POL'Y
405 (2010) [hereinafter Hartzog, The New Price to Play].
5.
See, e.g., Richards & Hartzog, Privacy's Trust Gap, supra note 3, at 1198; Richards &
Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously, supra note 3, at 444.
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While criticism of the over-use of consent in the consumer privacy
context is rising, critics lack a shared vocabulary with which to discuss
when consent is legitimate, when it is flawed, and how to talk about and
distinguish those flaws.6 Our lack of the right words and concepts with
which to talk about defects in consent models runs into the rhetorical,
cultural, and legal power of consent. As a consequence, consent criticism
can fail to gain traction in the minds of those who are undecided or who
have taken consent’s powerful “consenting adults” rhetoric at face value.
This results in a projection of gold standard norms onto the deficient digital
landscape in ways that we want to suggest are pathological. In this article,
we offer a conceptual framework for thinking about when consent is valid
and when it has pathologies, and a conceptual vocabulary for talking about
different kinds of pathologies that consent models can suffer. Our analysis
is focused on the consumer privacy context, but we believe that our model
and the vocabulary of the pathologies of consent can be useful in many of
the other areas of the law in which consent is frequently applied.
Let us be clear about our claim: We are not arguing for a wholesale
rejection of consent. A legal system without consent would be so radically
different from what we have that it would be almost unimaginable. More
fundamentally, we believe that consent should retain its prominent place in
our law generally. Our argument is more nuanced. Consent is undeniably
powerful, and often very attractive. But we have relied upon it too much,
and deployed it in ways and in contexts to do more harm than good, and in
ways that have masked the effects of largely unchecked (and sometimes
unconscionable) power.7 The gold standard of consent to data practices has
been articulated throughout our law as being “knowing and voluntary.”8
European law uses an analogous method to require consent that is “freely
given, specific, informed," and voluntary.9 But this ideal can only exist
6.
See Solove, supra note 3, at 1880–81; see also Edenberg & Jones, supra note 1, at 1810–14
(arguing in favor of locating the normative core of consent for data practices).
7.
See Solove, supra note 3, at 1894.
8.
See infra Part I.
9.
For example, the EU’s new General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) embodies this
concept by defining “consent” to require “any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous
indication of the data subject’s wishes by which he or she, by a statement or by a clear affirmative action,
signifies agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her.” Regulation 2016/679, art.
4(32), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 34. Recital 32 of the GDPR explains further that “Consent should be given
by a clear affirmative act establishing a freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of
the data subject’s agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her, such as by a written
statement, including by electronic means, or an oral statement.” Regulation 2016/679, pmbl. ¶ 32, 2016
O.J. (L 119) 1, 6.
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under certain circumstances,10 which is what we hope to illuminate in this
essay. We argue that consent is most valid when we are asked to choose
infrequently, when the potential harms that result from the consent are easy
to imagine, and when we have the correct incentives to consent consciously
and seriously. The further we fall from this gold standard, the more a
particular consent is pathological and thus suspect.
Beyond the conceptual framework and vocabulary, we offer a third
contribution to our understanding in this area. We believe that the theory of
consent pathologies offered here complicates a seductive but simplistic
story that has been offered in tech policy circles for over a decade. This is
the notion of the “privacy paradox”—the idea that consumer anxiety about
privacy is undermined by the fact that consumers act in privacy-diminishing
ways in practice. Understanding this phenomenon in terms of consent
pathologies reveals that consumers are not hypocrites who say one thing but
do another that reveals their true preferences. On the contrary, the
pathologies of consent show how consumers can be nudged and
manipulated by powerful companies against their actual interests, and this
phenomenon is easier when the legal regime that purports to protect
consumers falls far from the gold standard. As a fourth contribution, we
suggest that the solution is not to double down on our increasingly
pathological models of consent, but to look to other mechanisms that are
more sensitive to relationships and power differentials, such as those
designed to inspire the social trust that makes consent less necessary.
Our argument has four parts. In Part I, “the Empire of Consent,” we
survey the many instances of consent in our law, illustrating both the varied
work that consent performs and the varied tests for consent that courts and
legislatures have produced. We show how different legal regimes produce
different formulations on a continuum of how consent should be measured
by the law, and how much consent is necessary in particular contexts.
Toward the more restrictive end of the continuum, models of consent
coalesce around the standard of “knowing and voluntary,” for example in
the relinquishment of a fundamental right such as the right to a jury trial.
Yet in the digital context, the rhetorical practice of many technology
companies is to talk like they are offering informed consent while offering
something far inferior legal or practical matter.

10.
See Edenberg & Jones, supra note 1, at 1805 (“Consent can be legally binding, as long as the
transaction has met certain legal requirements or institutional standards defining the scope of consent.
The legal notion of consent is built on the moral notion; however, problems arise when legally binding
consent fails to capture the relevant morally legitimate transference of rights and obligations.”).
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The heart of our article is Part II, “the Pathologies of Consent,” in which
we offer a conceptual framework of the ways in which consent to data
practices might fall short of the gold standard. We begin with a note on our
methodology, adapted from the method by which the economist Richard
Thaler developed a series of critiques of the dominant rational actor model
in economics, thereby significantly contributing to the development of the
field of behavioral economics.11 We then offer three different sets of
circumstances in which we suspect that consent may be less accurate, useful
or legitimate. First, there is unwitting consent, which takes the “knowing”
out of “knowing and voluntary.” This can take at least three forms, including
not understanding the legal agreement, not understanding the technology
being agreed to, or not understanding the practical consequences or risks of
agreement. Second, there is coerced consent, a consent that takes the
“voluntary” out of “knowing and voluntary,” for example in cases where a
person is confronted with a choice between consent and the loss of an
important asset such as their life or their job. Third, there is incapacitated
consent, in which voluntariness is not available as a matter of law, such as
with children and others who are categorically incapable of legally
consenting.
In Part III, “Ideal Consent,” we suggest a set of preconditions necessary
for consent to achieve the ideal of being knowing and voluntary. Without
these preconditions, we argue that consent models will not be particularly
useful or legitimate. In fact, without these preconditions, consent models for
data practices risk being harmful and corrosive to the very autonomy they
seek to protect. First, the choice to be made must be infrequent (so as not to
overload the capacity of our minds to make rational choices). Second, the
harms which we might incur by granting consent must be vivid (i.e., they
must be easy to imagine).12 Third, the stakes of a decision to consent must
be significant (i.e., there is ample incentive to take each decision seriously).
Consent works well where these three criteria are satisfied. But where some
or all of these criteria are not present, consent starts to lose both its
usefulness and its very legitimacy. We call the presence of these three
factors gold standard consent, and argue that it should be the benchmark
against which the legal and ethical validity of consent are measured.

11.
For Thaler’s own description of his process, see RICHARD H. THALER, MISBEHAVING: THE
MAKING OF BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS (2016). For an application of this process in privacy law
scholarship, see ANITA ALLEN, UNPOPULAR PRIVACY: WHAT MUST WE HIDE? (2010).
12.
See M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1027, 1027 (2013).
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In Part IV, “Beyond Consent,” we offer a roadmap for a world in which
consent is cabined to the contexts in which it is most effective and most
legitimate. As elsewhere in the paper, we use the example of the laws
regulating consumer technologies powered by human information as our
example. We argue that while consent will and should remain an important
option in the legal toolbox, we should resist the easy but troublesome
tendency of always going to consent in the first instance. In other words, we
argue that consent should not be a common tool in modern data protection
regimes. To use the parlance of Silicon Valley, consent does not scale. It is
almost entirely incompatible with the modern realities of data and
technology in all but the most limited of circumstances.
Instead, building on other work, we propose a privacy framework with a
major focus on the concept of trust.13 Trust-based protections would require
parties in information relationships to protect the data placed in their care
and to treat each other fairly and with deference. They would prohibit
entrusted entities from asking for consent to practices that would make
people unreasonably vulnerable. Lawmakers looking to embrace trust and
minimize the pathologies of consent could leverage rules concerning the
design of technologies and legal prohibitions on consent such as
unconscionability to shift the policy conversation in a way that values both
consent and privacy, and protects the millions and millions of human beings
to whom these rules apply.
I. THE EMPIRE OF CONSENT
Consent flows through our legal system to such an extent that it would
be almost impossible to imagine our law without it. Consent’s importance
in our law has been recognized for generations. Henry Sumner Maine
famously observed in 1861 that “the movement of the progressive societies
has hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract.”14 Maine’s argument
was that unlike the premodern societies characterized by social interactions
structured by kinship and other forms of hierarchical ordering, modern
societies were increasingly characterized by social interactions structured

13.
See generally Richards & Hartzog, Privacy's Trust Gap, supra note 3; Richards & Hartzog,
Taking Trust Seriously, supra note 3; ARI WALDMAN, PRIVACY AS TRUST (2018); Jack Balkin,
Information Fiduciaries and the First Amendment, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1183 (2016).
14.
1 HENRY MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 101 (J.H. Morgan ed., J.M. Dent & Sons 1917) (1861).
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by contracts—private agreements whose chief hallmark was consent.15
Consent thus became one of our basic social structures, and if we look for
it, we can see it everywhere.
Let us take a moment to be precise about what we mean here. When we
talk about “consent” in this article, we mean a legal relationship
characterized in form or substance by agreement or a concurrence of wills.16
In a moral sense, we mean to rely on Edenberg and Jones’s definition of
consent as “effective communication of an intentional transfer of rights and
obligations between parties. Valid consent transforms the specific relation
between the consenter and consentee about a clearly defined action.”17 In its
strongest form, as Justice Story memorably put it in 1835, “[c]onsent is an
act of reason, accompanied with deliberation, the mind weighing, as in a
balance the good or evil on each side.”18 Yet as we will see below, the
prevalence of consent in our law includes weaker forms, including
presumed consent and even fictive consent. In this Part, we survey at a high
level some of the ways in which Maine’s observation about contractual
ordering has proven correct by showing how our law can be viewed in a
very real sense as an empire of consent.
Perhaps the easiest place to begin an appreciation of the role of consent
in our law is the common law. As all lawyers are familiar, contract law’s
basic elements of offer and acceptance are predicated on the notion of
consent. Contractual consent is objective, meaning it does not matter what
you actually thought you were consenting to, only what you objectively
manifested consent to.19 Contract law also allows consent to alternative
dispute resolution, via arbitration or mediation clauses, at least when such
contracts are not adhesionary, and there is bargaining power between the
contracting parties.20
Property law’s hallmark is the right of alienation—the voluntary right to
agree to transfer one’s property, real or personal—to another.21 This
15.
Katharina Isabel Schmidt, Henry Maine’s “Modern Law”: From Status to Contract and Back
Again?, 65 AM. J. COMP. L. 145, 154 (2017).
16.
Cf. Consent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“A voluntary yielding to what
another proposes or desires; agreement, approval, or permission regarding some act or purpose, esp.
given voluntarily by a competent person; legally effective assent.”).
17.
Edenberg & Jones, supra note 1, at 1811.
18.
1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 222 (1835).
19.
Hartzog, The New Price to Play, supra note 4.
20.
E.g., Sutton's Steel & Supply, Inc. v. Bellsouth Mobility, Inc., 776 So. 2d 589, 597 (La. Ct.
App. 2000).
21.
Thomas W. Merrill, The Property Strategy, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 2061, 2079 (2012).
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principle runs throughout the law of property, but it is easiest to appreciate
in the rules governing gifts, which require donative intent (a donor
voluntarily intending (i.e., consenting) to give a gift to the donee), delivery
(physical transfer of the gift to the donee), and acceptance (consent to the
gift by the donee).22 Similarly, consent allows exceptions to the right to
exclude, whether by turning a trespasser into a dinner guest, or by allowing
the creation of licenses, easements, and bailments.
Consent is less central in tort law, which imposes duties that flow to the
general population or some subset thereof, like in the case of the duty to
exercise reasonable care. But consent remains important, for it can work to
assume the risks of someone else’s actions. Thus, if you are my karate
instructor, and you negligently (or even recklessly) injure me, I might be
unable to recover if I sue you because I assumed the risk of engaging in the
dangerous sport and consented to spar with you in the first place.23 Or if you
go to watch the Boston Red Sox and are injured by a foul ball, the Red Sox
will probably be immune from suit because you are presumed to have
accepted the risk of injury by consenting to watch them play at Fenway Park
(or wherever).24
With respect to intentional torts like assault, battery, conversion, and
trespass, consent is typically treated as an affirmative defense.25 Consider a
surgical procedure, which would be a legal battery without consent, and
even where some consent is supplied can become a battery again when
consent is exceeded.26 Consider further the important role consent plays in
the complex of “privacy torts,” the subset of intentional torts dealing with
the collection, dissemination, and use of sensitive personal information. The
four torts recognized by William Prosser27—intrusion into seclusion,
disclosure of private facts, false light publicity, and appropriation of
likeness—are all negated by consent to the invasion of privacy.28 Thus, for
example, it violates the intrusion tort when a surgeon photographs a patient
during cosmetic breast surgery, and the patient’s consent form does not
22.
Guardian State Bank & Tr. Co. v. Jacobson, 369 N.W.2d 80, 83–84 (Neb. 1985).
23.
E.g., Levine v. Gross, 704 N.E.2d 262, 263 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997).
24.
Costa v. Boston Red Sox Baseball Club, 809 N.E.2d 1090 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004).
25.
Consent, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 16.
26.
E.g., Kaplan v. Mamelak, 75 Cal. Rptr. 3d 861 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
27.
William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960). For additional background
about the privacy torts and Prosser’s role in their creation, see G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN
AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 176–179 (expanded ed. 2003); Neil M. Richards & Daniel J.
Solove, Prosser’s Privacy Law: A Mixed Legacy, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1887 (2010).
28.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A(2) (1977).
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cover such uses of the photographs.29 Consent to have your image used for
commercial purposes is also a defense to an action for appropriation of
likeness for commercial gain.30 Of course, there are more intentional torts
governing the collection, use, and disclosure of information than the four
recognized by Prosser. A full “expanded set” of privacy torts includes
trespass, breach of confidence, defamation, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress.31 Yet even this broader group of torts can be negated by
defense—a trespasser with permission becomes a licensee or even a guest,32
permission to disclose eliminates a duty of confidentiality,33 and you can
permit (or pay) someone to say mean or false things about you. In all of
these cases, if you consent, you cannot sue.
Beyond contracts, property, and tort, consent also plays an important role
in the law regulating family and sexual relations. For over a century, courts
have recognized that “[t]he fundamental principle of all marriage is mutual
consent.”34 This principle was echoed in Obergefell v. Hodges, when the
Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the right of
marital choice, a concept that runs throughout its analysis.35 The foundation
of the Court’s analysis is thus its statement that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s liberty guarantee “extend[s] to certain personal choices
central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices that
define personal identity and beliefs.”36 The Court concluded that “[u]nder
the Constitution, same-sex couples seek in marriage the same legal
treatment as opposite-sex couples, and it would disparage their choices and
diminish their personhood to deny them this right.”37 Consent runs broadly
throughout the rest of family law as well; it can be the difference between a
loving sexual act and sexual assault or rape. The age at which it becomes
legal to engage in sexual activity is of course known as the “age of
29.
Judge v. Saltz Plastic Surgery, 330 P.3d 126 (Utah Ct. App. 2014).
30.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977).
31.
NEIL RICHARDS, INTELLECTUAL PRIVACY: RETHINKING CIVIL LIBERTIES FOR THE DIGITAL
AGE 158 (2015).
32.
E.g., State v. Pixley, 200 A.3d 174, 177 (Vt. 2018) (explaining that trespass requires a person
to enter the land without legal authority or consent).
33.
E.g., Grimminger v. Maitra, 887 A.2d 276, 279 (Sup. Ct. Pa. 2005) (patient consent serves
as an affirmative defense to a claim of a breach of physician-patient confidentiality).
34.
Recent Cases: Marriage — Validity — Common-Law Marriage — Mistake as to Existence
of Prior Marriage Between the Parties, 34 HARV. L. REV. 561, 561 (1921) (summarizing the holding of
Great N. Ry. Co. v. Johnson, 254 F. 683 (8th Cir. 1918)).
35.
135 S. Ct. 2584, 2605 (2015).
36.
Id. at 2597.
37.
Id. at 2602.
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consent.”38 Consent is also the key feature in the legality of some sexual
activities in BDSM39 and is also an issue when elderly married couples
engage in sexual activity when one partner has lost the capacity to legally
consent.40
Beyond the common law, consent also plays a critical role in the context
of digital privacy regulation. In the United States, the dominant regime of
privacy regulation is known as “notice and choice.” As interpreted by the
Federal Trade Commission under its Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices
authority, this has meant that consumers are presumed to have consented to
data practices as long as there has been some kind of “notice” to the
consumer about what is happening and some kind of “choice” about
whether they want it to happen. A recent FTC report on company
surveillance of consumers across digital devices (for example tracking
laptop web browsing activity to deliver targeted ads to the same consumer
on a cell phone) is illustrative of the FTC’s approach:
As with traditional forms of tracking, companies should offer
consumers choices about how their cross-device activity is tracked.
And, when companies offer such choices, the FTC Act requires that
the companies respect them. To the extent opt-out tools are provided,
any material limitations on how they apply or are implemented with
respect to cross-device tracking must be clearly and conspicuously
disclosed.41
In practice, however, such requirements are relatively easy to comply with,
as all a company needs to do to avoid FTC liability for unfair or deceptive
trade practices if challenged is show that their use of consent is neither
deceptive nor unfair.42 Thus “notice” can mean a vague but not false
description of data practices buried deep within a long privacy policy and
“choice” can mean no more than the choice to use the service in the first
place (Apple, Android, or no phone at all, for example).43 It is perhaps for
38.
E.g., State v. Holloway, 916 N.W.2d 338, 345 (Minn. 2018) (“What has been known as
statutory rape—sexual conduct with a person not of the age of consent—has been a crime in Minnesota
since it was first organized as a territory.”).
39.
See William Eskridge, The Many Faces of Sexual Consent, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 47, 49–
50 (1995); Margo Kaplan, Sex-Positive Law, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 89, 117 (2014).
40.
Alexander Boni-Saenz, Sexual Advance Directives, 68 ALA. L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2016).
41.
FED. TRADE COMM'N, CROSS-DEVICE TRACKING: AN FTC REPORT 13 (Jan. 2017).
42.
Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (prohibiting the use of “unfair” or “deceptive” trade practices in or
affecting interstate commerce).
43.
WOODROW HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT: THE BATTLE TO CONTROL THE DESIGN OF
NEW TECHNOLOGIES 58–72 (2017) [hereinafter HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT].
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this reason that when Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg testified before
Congress in response to a series of privacy scandals involving his company,
his defense, first and foremost, was that Facebook puts its users in
“control,”44 a good sound bite, but one that can be all but meaningless as a
legal requirement.
Consent within Europe’s data protection frameworks is more rigorous
than in parts of US privacy law. Indeed, unlike US law, the European Union
(EU) treats privacy and the related but distinct concept of data protection as
fundamental rights. Consent remains central to this fundamental rightsbased approach, although Europe’s modern data protection regime is
skeptical of over-relying on the notion.45 Recital Seven of the EU General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR explicitly states that “Natural persons
should have control of their own personal data.”46 This control is effectuated
significantly through the mechanism of “informed consent” as a basis for
legitimizing data processing.47 Beyond the GDPR, the reasoning behind the
44.
Written Testimony from Facebook to House Energy and Commerce Committee for Record
of April 11, 2018 Hearing (June 29, 2018), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF00/20180411/108090/
HHRG-115-IF00-Wstate-ZuckerbergM-20180411.pdf [https://perma.cc/B7LR-L7XU] (note: the word
‘control’ is mentioned over 1,000 times). It goes on like this for a while. See also Dan Fletcher, How
Facebook is Redefining Privacy, TIME (May 20, 2010), http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,
9171,1990798-4,00.html [https://perma.cc/D66L-4FG3] (“‘The way that people think about privacy is
changing a bit . . . . What people want isn't complete privacy. It isn't that they want secrecy. It's that they
want control over what they share and what they don't.’”); Anita Balakrishnan, Matt Hunter & Sara
Salinas, Mark Zuckerberg Has Been Talking About Privacy for 15 Years—Here’s Almost Everything
He’s Said, CNBC (Apr. 9, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/03/21/facebook-ceo-mark-zuckerbergsstatements-on-privacy-2003-2018.html [https://perma.cc/Q4QM-JGFA] ("‘When I built the first version
of Facebook, almost nobody I knew wanted a public page on the internet. That seemed scary. But as
long as they could make their page private, they felt safe sharing with their friends online. Control was
key.’”); Emily Stewart, The Privacy Question Mark Zuckerberg Kept Dodging, VOX (Apr. 11, 2018),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/4/11/17225518/mark-zuckerberg-testimony-facebookprivacy-settings-sharing [https://perma.cc/DQ84-Q2GD] (“‘Every time that a person chooses to share
something on Facebook, they’re proactively going to the service and choosing that they want to share a
photo, write a message to someone, and every time, there is a control right there, not buried in settings
somewhere but right there when they’re posting, about who they’re sharing with.’”).
45.
See Edenberg & Jones, supra note 1; see also Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Bart van der Sloot &
Frederik Zuiderveen Borgesius, The European Union General Data Protection Regulation: What It Is
And What It Means, 28 INFO. & COMM. TECH. L. 65, 68 (2019) (“[T]he GDPR is constitutionally
skeptical of U.S. lawyers’ favorite tool: consent, particularly of the low-quality or ‘take it or leave it’
variety. The GDPR’s architects realized that if low-voluntariness consent could justify data activities,
the GDPR would just become another exercise in clicking ‘I agree’ to unread, unnegotiable terms. The
GDPR requires high-quality consent, on par with important life decisions, such as consent to medical
treatment. In many contexts, the burdens the GDPR places on consent make consent impossible as
mechanism to make data uses legal. Moreover, many rules in the GDPR are not waivable and continue
to apply after somebody has consented to data use.”).
46.
Regulation 2016/679, pmbl. ¶ 7, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 2.
47.
Regulation 2016/679, art. 7, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1, 37.
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EU ePrivacy Directive is that it “enhances end-user’s control by clarifying
that consent can be expressed through appropriate technical settings.”48 But
as we will discuss in the Parts that follow, hard-coding consent through legal
or technical code is fraught at best. It also probably makes things worse
because it offers an illusion of control that dulls impetus for meaningful
change while entrenching the pathologies of the concept into the very design
of information technologies.49
American constitutional law does not recognize a broad constitutional
right to privacy the way the EU does. But when constitutional rights are at
issue in privacy or elsewhere, U.S. law (like the EU) puts consent at the core
of rights jurisprudence. Indeed, consent is at the very core of American
constitutionalism. Consider these familiar founding words from the
beginning of the Declaration of Independence: “We hold these truths to be
self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their
Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty
and the pursuit of Happiness.—That to secure these rights, Governments are
instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the
governed.”50
Consent’s importance runs throughout constitutional law, particularly
with respect to the doctrine of waiver. Constitutional rights can be waived,
and waiver is essentially the consent to give up that right. When it comes to
waiver, however, the Supreme Court has made clear that consent to waiver
must be clearly and freely given. Sometimes this is textual, such as where
the Third Amendment expressly includes consent as a defense to the
quartering of soldiers in private homes: “No Soldier shall, in time of peace
be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of
war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.”51 More significantly,
numerous constitutional rights can only be waived where there is a showing
that such waivers are knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. This is the case,

48.
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Concerning the
Respect for Private Life and the Protection of Personal Data in Electronic Communications and
Repealing Directive 2002/58/EC, at 3.4, COM (2017) 10 final (Jan. 10, 2017).
49.
See, e.g., HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT, supra note 43; Lee Bygrave, Data Protection
by Design and by Default: Deciphering the EU's Legislative Requirements, 4 OSLO L. REV. 105 (2017);
Woodrow Hartzog, The Case Against Idealising Control, 4 EUR. DATA PROTECT. L. REV. 423 (2018),
https://edpl.lexxion.eu/article/edpl/2018/4/5/display/html [https://perma.cc/T4LA-HNE8] [hereinafter
Hartzog, The Case Against Idealising Control].
50.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (emphasis added).
51.
U.S. CONST. amend. III.
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for example, for both the right to counsel52 and the right to trial by jury.53
Many constitutional rights can also be contracted around. For example, the
First Amendment permits non-disclosure agreements—contracts not to
speak—such as where journalists agree with confidential sources not to
disclose their names in exchange for a story.54 The Supreme Court has held
that such contracts are enforceable against the press consistent with the First
Amendment even where the identity of the source is itself newsworthy.55
Consent is also a critical element of health law. Reflecting the
importance of the human interests involved, rules for consent in the health
context are strict in ways resembling constitutional law, often requiring a
heightened form of consent known as “informed consent.” One of the
foundations of modern biomedical ethics is the Belmont Report, a product
of the National Research Act of 1974, which established a commission to
study the basic ethical principles that should undergird biomedical and
behavioral research involving human subjects.56 The Belmont report
announced three “Basic Ethical Principles” of “respect for persons,”
“beneficence,” and “justice,” and it offered three “applications” of these
principles, the first of which was “informed consent.”57 The Belmont
Report’s definition of informed consent states “[r]espect for persons
requires that subjects, to the degree that they are capable, be given the
opportunity to choose what shall or shall not happen to them.”58 In practice,
the Report urged that subjects be given the relevant information on which
to make their decision, that researchers ensure that test subjects have
comprehension of the information surrounding their decision, and that
decisions be made in accordance with the idea of voluntariness.
The Belmont Report has been tremendously influential in the field of
biomedical ethics, and today its recommendations are reflected in the
Common Rule, the ethical rule that governs U.S. government funded
biomedical and behavioral research. The Common Rule prescribes detailed

52.
Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458 (1994).
53.
Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275 (1942).
54.
Cohen v. Cowles Media, 501 U.S. 663, 669–70 (1991).
55.
Id. See generally Daniel J. Solove & Neil M. Richards, Rethinking Free Speech and Civil
Liability, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1650 (2009).
56.
The Belmont Report: Ethical Principles and Guidelines for the Protection of Human Subjects
of Research, 44 Fed. Reg. 23,192 (Apr. 18, 1979).
57.
Id. at 23,193.
58.
Id. at 23,195.
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substantive and documentary requirements for “informed consent.”59 There
are extensive professional and academic literatures on informed consent in
a variety of medical contexts reflecting substantial work and reflection. One
classic treatise, for example, identifies five critical elements for truly
informed consent—disclosure; comprehension or understanding;
voluntariness; decision-making capacity or competence; and
authorization.60
The “knowing and voluntary” waiver standard from constitutional law
and the informed consent standard from biomedical ethics each represent a
kind of what we might think of as a “gold standard” consent. One could add
another such example from the commercial context—freely negotiated
agreements between sophisticated parties who have equal bargaining
power, significant resources, and who knowingly and voluntary agree to
assume contractual or other legal obligations. These are the models from
which consent derives its strength—decisions to engage in activity based
upon full information and free, voluntary, and informed choice. They are
consent in its strongest and most legitimate form.
Let’s take a step back at this point and look at the forest rather than the
trees. Our review of consent models in the law can be distilled into three
important principles. First, consent requirements are prevalent in many—if
not most—areas of American law, running throughout common law,
constitutional law, and regulatory law. Second, consent models vary in how
strictly they protect consenting individuals, from the stringent consent
requirements in constitutional law and health and human subjects research
all the way down to the opt-out consents in commercial transactions that are
so common in the digital environment. Third, despite this variance, there
does exist a “gold standard” of consent, which is stringent and highly
protective of individuals, whether we call it “informed consent,” “knowing
and voluntary” agreement or waiver, or something else entirely. We would
suggest that in spite of consent’s variance in practice, it is this gold standard
of consent that policymakers, advocates, and others refer to when they talk
about consent. Indeed, even Facebook’s public statements about “control”
in the abstract evoke a much stronger notion of consent than the watereddown legal requirements under which the company operates in practice (at
least in the United States). When companies like Facebook negotiate
59.
See Common Rule, 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.116 (general requirements for informed consent), 46.117
(documentation requirements for informed consent).
60.
RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT
274 (1986); see also Natalie Ram, Tiered Consent and the Tyranny of Choice, 48 JURIMETRICS 253,
259–60 (2008).
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acquisitions or commercial deals with other companies, they typically enjoy
(for themselves) gold standard consent informed by the finest lawyers
money can buy. Yet when their individual human customers agree to use
their services, it is fair to say that the level of information and power
available to those individual humans is some distance away from the gold
standard. It is to this gap between the gold standard of consent companies
enjoy and the weaker kinds of consent many consumers “enjoy” in the
digital environment that we will now turn.
II. THREE PATHOLOGIES OF CONSENT
When he was a young academic, the American economist Richard Thaler
kept a list of ways in which people consistently acted irrationally. Thaler’s
list was not merely a lark by a bored iconoclastic graduate student. His list
documented a series of human behaviors that the dominant theory of
economics, the rational actor theory, failed to adequately explain. Again and
again, Thaler kept encountering observable patterns of human behavior that
were squarely at odds with the foundational assumption of economics that
human beings act rationally to maximize their utility.
Thaler’s list became a research agenda, as he and others began
experimental studies of the behaviors he had observed. This community of
scholars kept working, and these critiques of the dominant rational actor
model helped to create the field of behavioral economics.61 This field
proceeds from the evidence that human beings do not always behave as the
rational actor model assumes that they would—Thaler refers to these
fictional humans as “econs.” Instead, the field assumes that people behave
in an observable and empirically-demonstrable way like “humans”:
sometimes acting rationally, sometimes less than fully rationally, and
sometimes irrationally. Behavioral economists, building on the work of
Thaler and his mentors Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, attribute
these behaviors to cognitive structures—and limitations—in the human
brain.62 They argue that humans, in the words of another leading scholar in
the field, are not merely irrational, but predictably so.63 Kahneman offers
helpful metaphor for understanding how the human mind works. Most of
the time, we operate using “System One,” an automatic system of cognition
that relies upon heuristics and assumptions to help us navigate the world.
61.
See generally THALER, supra note 11.
62.
See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW (2011); Amos Tversky & Daniel
Kahneman, Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974).
63.
See DAN ARIELY, PREDICTABLY IRRATIONAL: THE HIDDEN FORCES THAT SHAPE OUR
DECISIONS (2008).
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Other times, when we encounter something new or really want to think
something through, we use what Kahneman calls “System Two.” System
Two is more analytical and rational, but it is also lazy and relies as much as
it can on System One because “thinking slow” is taxing on our energies and
on the sugar reserves in our brain. System One allows us to drive to work
while what we think of as our mind (“System Two”) is occupied by the
news. System One allows us to carefully read a law review article, even
though we might derive more pleasure when we breeze through a novel (or
a Netflix stream) using System Two.64
In this Part, we adapt Thaler’s list methodology to privacy law—
specifically to three scenarios we have observed in which consumers in the
digital environment “consent” to data practices in ways that seem irrational.
We offer these cases as “Pathologies of Consent” and conclude that
sometimes the behavior can be explained by defects in the law, especially
where the law requires less than “gold standard” consent, whereas other
times the behavior may be explained by particular features of human
cognition. Nevertheless, like Thaler’s list, our suggestions are theoretical.
To the extent we make empirical claims, such claims are primarily anecdotal
rather than (at present) proven by experimental social science. In this
respect, we follow a similar privacy law methodology to the one used by
Anita Allen in her classic work Unpopular Privacy.65
Thaler’s list complicated a relatively simplistic story that the rational
actor model told about human behavior. We believe that our list of consent
pathologies complicates a more specific (but equally simplistic) rational
actor story that has circulated in privacy circles for a number of years as the
“privacy paradox.” The “privacy paradox” is the assertion that although
people might express a concern for privacy in the abstract, their actual
behavior suggests that they do not actually care about their privacy in
practice. Observers coming from a rational actor perspective suggest that
the actions of consumers (what an economist would call their revealed
preferences) indicate that consumers do not really care about privacy at all,
and that concerns about privacy in the consumer context are overblown.66
To return to Mark Zuckerberg’s testimony before Congress, if Facebook
puts consumers in control of their privacy, but consumers continue to
consent to privacy-revealing practices and act in privacy-destructive ways,
they have no one to blame but themselves. Buyers beware.
64.
KAHNEMAN, supra note 62, at 20–24.
65.
See ALLEN, supra note 11.
66.
E.g., Patricia A. Norberg et al., The Privacy Paradox: Personal Information Disclosure
Intentions versus Behaviors, 41 J. CONSUMER AFF. 100 (2007).
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We believe that the three pathologies we offer in this Part complicate this
simplistic and self-serving story, and we explain why consumers might
understandably care about their privacy and agree to data practices that
undermine their privacy and expose them to the risks of informational
harms. (We also note that scholars working in the Thaler tradition have
already begun the process of experimental testing of the ways in which
consumers understand privacy in practice, with initial findings that confirm
the intuitive and theoretical model we offer here.)67
There are certainly more than three ways in which consent in practice
can deviate from gold standard consent, but for present purposes the three
we offer here will suffice. They are unwitting consent, coerced consent, and
incapacitated consent.
A. Unwitting Consent
Let’s say that you are signing up for a new account with a tech company
whose app or web site will let you do something. Perhaps you are signing
up for a loyalty club at your local coffee or bagel shop, perhaps you are
signing up for a new taxi app, dating app, or social network, or perhaps your
iPhone or Android needs a security update that you fear will lead to a data
breach if you don’t agree. Like most consumers, you’re in a hurry. (In the
bagel example, maybe the people queuing behind you want to buy their
bagels,68 or maybe you are just hungry and want to finish the transaction so
you can eat.) In any event, most consumer transactions these days have an
informational component—the social network you join, the bagel app you
download, the web sites you read, or the car you buy. The problem is, most
consumers don’t know what data practices are possible, what they have
agreed to, or what the informational risks of the transaction are.
This is the problem of unwitting consent. In the complex technological
and legal landscape in which the contemporary digital consumer finds
herself, understanding what is going on can be challenging. Yet people are
harried, busy, and distracted, so they understandably click the “I agree”
button and move on with their day, hoping that all will be well. This is
67.
For excellent reviews of the theoretical and empirical research in this field, see Alessandro
Acquisti, Curtis Taylor & Liad Wagman, The Economics of Privacy, 54 J. ECON. LITERATURE 442
(2016); Alessandro Acquisti, Laura Brandimarte & George Loewenstein, Privacy and Human Behavior
in the Age of Information, 347 SCIENCE 509 (2015).
68.
In full disclosure, this is exactly what happened to one of the authors of this article recently,
at an Einstein Brother’s Bagels. The friendly clerk urged him to install the loyalty app at the point of
sale, while the hungry customers behind him pressured him into clicking “I agree.”
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unwitting consent. Unwitting consent takes the “knowing” out of “knowing
and voluntary.” Simply put, far too often, far too many people in the digital
environment have little to no idea about what data practices or exposure that
they are consenting to. Compounding this problem (and enabling business
practices that create and prey upon unwitting consent) is the conclusion
reached by several courts that privacy policies, standing alone, are simply
not enforceable as contracts.69 At the same time, privacy policies that are
incorporated into the terms of use that people consent to by clicking “I
agree” are generally recognized as part of a binding contractual agreement.70
In fact, one of the reasons consent is such a poor fit for data practices is
that boilerplate contract law is largely agnostic to whether people actually
know what they are agreeing to. This is known as the objective theory of
contracts. Under this theory, the intent of the parties, for example, ‘I thought
I was agreeing to “X,” is irrelevant. Instead, the contract is formed based on
what a reasonable person would have been led to believe in the relevant
context (an objective standard).71 Although this doctrine is criticized by
many as it applies to boilerplate contracts,72 generally parties need not have
a “meeting of the minds” in the classic contractual sense. Rather, a
“reasonable communication” of the terms will suffice.73 In data processing
contexts with lengthy terms of use agreements, this dynamic puts all of the
risk on the user, because consent can be effective even if you have no idea
what you just agreed to. Once again, buyer beware.
Unwitting consent can take several forms. First, consumers can fail to
understand the legal agreement governing the information relationship they
now have with the company. This can happen when the legal agreement is
69.
In re Nw. Airlines Privacy Litig., No. 04-126, 2004 WL 1278459, at *16–18 (D. Minn. 2004);
In re JetBlue Airways Corp. Privacy Litig., 379 F. Supp. 2d 299, 316–18 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
70.
Hartzog, The New Price to Play, supra note 4, at 408; Woodrow Hartzog, Website Design As
Contract, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1635, 1635 (2011) (“When courts seek to determine a website user's privacy
expectations and the website's promises to that user, they almost invariably look to the terms of use
agreement or to the privacy policy.”).
71.
Hartzog, The New Price to Play, supra note 4, at 416; see also Wickberg v. Lyft, No. 1812094-RGS, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 213281 (D. Mass. Dec. 19, 2018)
72.
See KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS, supra note 3; RADIN, supra note 3; Hartzog, The New Price to
Play, supra note 4.
73.
See Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 429 (2d Cir. 2004); Molnar v. 1-800Flowers.com, No. 08-cv-0542, 2008 WL 4772125, at *7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 2008) (stating that “courts
have held that a party's use of a website may be sufficient to give rise to an inference of assent to the
terms of use contained therein”); Southwest Airlines Co. v. Boardfirst, LLC, No. 3:06-cv-0891, 2007
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96230, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2007); Pollstar v. Gigmania Ltd., 170 F. Supp. 2d
974, 982 (E.D. Cal. 2000) (stating that “the browser wrap license agreement may be arguably valid and
enforceable”).
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too long (such as Apple’s notoriously lengthy Terms of Services
Agreement),74 the legal agreement uses confusing language, structure, and
syntax (such as when consent forms deploy double and triple negatives or
switch from “opt out” to “opt in” options in a series of choices),75 the legal
agreement is too technical for ordinary readers to understand (many privacy
policies reference technologies like pixel tags and MAC addresses, which
are likely foreign concepts to the average user),76 or the legal agreement is
too vague to specify exactly what is being agreed to (consider Amazon’s
notoriously vague “Privacy Notice” which features terms like “we share
your information with third parties, to permit them to send you marketing
communications.”). 77
A second dimension of unwitting consent is where consumers do not
understand the technology that mediates their relationship with the
company. For example, most people don’t realize that telecommunications
74.
Apple’s iOS Terms of Service (TOS) is notoriously long. Its current version, for iOS12, is
6,901 words long. iOS Software Agreement, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/legal/sla/docs/iOS12.pdf
[https:// perma.cc/VC8B-8V48]. However, Apple’s web site also contains thirteen other TOS
agreements for iOS 3.1, 4.1, 5.0, 5.1, 6.0, 7.0, 8.0, 8.1, 9.0, 9.1, 10, 11, and 11.2. In 2017, cartoonist R.
Sikoroyak turned the related Apple iTunes TOS agreement into a 96-page comic book starring Steve
Jobs as its hero and featuring classic comic book styles and characters from The Simpsons to Snoopy to
Family Circus. See Bonnie Burton, Steve Jobs, Superhero: Graphic Novel Meets iTunes Service Terms,
CNET (Mar. 8, 2017), https://www.cnet.com/news/itunes-terms-of-service-graphic-novel-comic-rsikoroyak/ [http://perma.cc /DC88-8PS5].
75.
Consider this example from a request by a California school system regarding student
directory information:

HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT, supra note 43, at 145. Or this confusing series of choices from “opt
out” to “opt in”:

Trick Questions, DARK PATTERNS, https://darkpatterns.org/types-of-dark-pattern/trick-questions
[https://perma.cc/7R7F-6FYD].
76.
Privacy
Policy,
THE
STREET,
INC.,
http://corporate.thestreet.com/privacy
[https://perma.cc/3WS9-RMT3].
77.
Amazon.com
Privacy
Notice,
AMAZON,
https://www.amazon.com/gp/help/c
ustomer/display.html?nodeId=468496 [https://perma.cc/2AE4-B4L7].
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systems are remarkably insecure.78 We give consent to these companies
upon the assumption that their systems will protect us, but we are often
mistaken about how those systems are configured. A prominent recent
example is the scandal over Facebook’s user interface that allowed for the
exfiltration of massive amounts of data to Cambridge Analytica, the data
firm accused of, among other things, dubious data practices with respect to
electoral politics.79
Technically, Facebook users “consented” to the collection and sharing
of this data via their privacy settings.80 Facebook went to great lengths to
emphasize this fact, stating “Aleksandr Kogan requested and gained access
to information from users who chose to sign up to his app, and everyone
involved gave their consent. People knowingly provided their
information.”81 But a closer look reveals that this consent was basically
manufactured through obfuscation, abstraction, and sleight of hand via a
user interface. Users likely had little idea what they were agreeing to, in no
small part because the way the technology actually worked was opaque to
users.
Professor Ian Bogost, who also had an application using the same
interface as that at issue in the Cambridge Analytica scandal, wrote of
Facebook’s system:
App authorizations are not exceptionally clear. For one thing, the user
must accept the app’s request to share data with it as soon as they
open it for the first time, even before knowing what the app does or
why. For another, the authorization is presented by Facebook, not by
the third party, making it seem official, safe, and even endorsed.82

78.
Sarah Jamie Lewis (@SarahJamieLewis), TWITTER (Jan. 8, 2019, 10:34 PM), https://twitter.
com/SarahJamieLewis/status/1082888359008120832 [https://perma.cc/U632-3P5F]; Joseph Cox, Big
Telecom Sold Highly Sensitive Customer GPS Data Typically Used for 911 Calls, VICE, (Feb. 6, 2019),
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/a3b3dg/big-telecom-sold-customer-gps-data-911-calls [http
s://perma.cc/DDH8-HEMH].
79.
See, e.g., The Cambridge Analytical Files, GUARDIAN, https://www.theguardian.com/n
ews/series/cambridge-analytica-files [https://perma.cc/TL6P-PA3Y].
80.
Ian Bogost, My Cow Game Extracted Your Facebook Data, ATLANTIC (Mar. 22, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/03/my-cow-game-extracted-your-facebook-data
/556214/ [https://perma.cc/CN2R-9LD4].
81.
Paul Grewal, Suspending Cambridge Analytica and SCL Group from Facebook, FACEBOOK:
NEWSROOM (Mar. 17, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/03/suspending-cambridge-analytic a/
[https://perma.cc/76FD-7MUR].
82.
Bogost, supra note 80.
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Bogost was critical of Facebook’s flimsy consent structure, explaining
that “[t]he part of the Facebook website where apps appear, under the blue
top navigation (as seen above), introduces further confusion. To the average
web user, especially a decade ago, it looked like the game or app was just a
part of Facebook itself.”83 Bogost noted the seamless nature of the website
that lacked a clear boundary between Facebook’s navigation and the thirdparty app. He explained that “[i]f you look at the browser address bar while
using a Facebook app on the website, the URL begins with
“apps.facebook.com,” further cementing the impression that the user was
safely ensconced in the comforting, blue cradle of Facebook’s care.84
Of course, that impression bore little relationship to reality. When people
opened a third-party app, Facebook’s servers passed along a request to the
server where the app developer hosts their services. Then, the app sent all
of its responses back to Facebook, which formatted the responses as if they
were coming from Facebook rather than the third party.85 Through this
setup, the third-party app was able to access significant amounts of personal
and potentially sensitive information.86
As the previous description suggests, consumer are unlikely to
understand the complexities of layered applications and their correlated,
opaque, data flows. We certainly are no experts. Lacking such knowledge,
the “consent” requested by Facebook in this manner seems farcical. Bogost
accused Facebook of “presenting apps as quasi-endorsed extensions of its
core service to users who couldn’t have been expected to know better.”87
The reason people felt so violated by Facebook could be that “they might
never have realized that they were even using foreign, non-Facebook
applications in the first place, let alone ones that were siphoning off and
selling their data. The website always just looked like Facebook.”88
Another prominent example of unwitting consent involves third party
tracking through the use of advertising technology, or “ad tech,” as it is
83.
Id.
84.
Id.
85.
Id.
86.
Id. (describing that as an app developer using Facebook’s interface “I was able to access two
potentially sensitive pieces of data without even trying. The first is a player’s Facebook ID. . . . Those
data could be correlated against other information—data collected from Facebook, fashioned by the app,
or acquired elsewhere. . . . The second type of information is a piece of profile data [my app] received
without asking for it. Back in 2010, Facebook still allowed users to join “networks” —affiliations like
schools, workplaces, and organizations. In some cases, those affiliations required authorization, for
example having an email address at a domain that corresponds with a university.”).
87.
Id.
88.
Id.
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known in the industry. Ad tech involves technologies like ad networks,
which serve “as a broker between a group of publishers and a group of
advertisers,”89 and ad servers, which are “used by ad networks, publishers,
advertisers, and ad agencies to manage, run, and report on their advertising
campaigns.”90 These networks and technologies are remarkably complex,
with auctions conducted in milliseconds and involve a bevy of different
companies processing your data to serve ads personalized on the basis of
that data.91 Even advocates of consent regimes realize how daunting this
problem is, conjuring up euphemisms like “consent strings” for ad tech to
simplify and streamline compliance.92
In January 2017, the FTC released a staff report on the problem of crossdevice tracking, the practice discussed above in which “platforms,
publishers, and ad tech companies try to connect a consumer’s activity
across her smartphones, tablets, desktop computers, and other connected
devices. The goal of cross-device tracking is to enable companies to link a
consumer’s behavior across her devices.”93 The FTC’s proposed solutions
to this problem, however, were underwhelming. It recommended merely
that “companies engaged in cross-device tracking: (1) be transparent about
their data collection and use practices; (2) provide choice mechanisms that
give consumers control over their data; (3) provide heightened protections
for sensitive information, including health, financial, and children’s
information; and (4) maintain reasonable security of collected data.”94
Consistent with much of American privacy law, this amounted to notice,
choice, heightened notice and choice for a few sensitive areas, and data
security.
89.
Maciej Zawadziński, What is an Ad Network and How Does It Work?, CLEARCODE (Mar. 7,
2018), https://clearcode.cc/blog/what-is-an-ad-network-and-how-does-it-work/ [https://perma.cc/4D64DP7D].
90.
Id.
91.
Id.
92.
Nicole Lindsey, Could GDPR Consent String Fraud Bring Down the Whole Ad Tech
Ecosystem?, CPO MAGAZINE (Dec. 5, 2018), https://www.cpomagazine.com/data-protection/could-gdp
r-consent-string-fraud-bring-down-the-whole-ad-tech-ecosystem/ [https://perma.cc/V5MT-VUGF] (“A
consent string is a unique series of numbers generated by a publisher’s consent management platform
(CMP) and then shared with all digital ad partners. The consent string includes information such as the
identity of a vendor, whether or not they have user consent to use data to serve them personalized ads,
and how any identifying personal data can be used. The most important consent data is a single bit (a
‘1’ or a ‘0’) that tells an ad tech vendor whether they can serve up personalized ads. If the value is ‘1,’
then the ad tech vendor has user consent; if the value is ‘0,’ then the ad tech vendor does not have user
consent.”).
93.
FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 41, at i.
94.
Id. at ii.
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But given the complexity of ad tech, this puts companies in a nearly
impossible situation: either they must simplify enough to keep the
information digestible or be detailed enough to fully explain data collection
and use practices, which requires some explanation of how the technology
actually works. This approach will let everyone down, and consumers will
be lost either way. As one of us has explained:
The modern data ecosystem is mind-bogglingly complex, with many
different kinds of information collected in many different ways,
stored in many different places, processed for many different
functions, and shared with many other parties. All that nuance gets
glossed over when companies try to simplify and shorten
information, the risk hidden or made to seem more benign through
abstraction.95
But if companies are too specific, people will suffer from decision fatigue
and depleted limited resources to actually reach or process the tomes of
information thrown at them. Unwitting consent lies in every direction.
A third version of unwitting consent is that consumers might not
understand the consequences or risks of the informational relationship. As
a general rule, people have difficulty assessing future risks created by
present decisions.96 We’re far too optimistic; we rely too much on the past
and lived experience over reliable, generalizable data; we discount future
costs too much; and we think the way things are now will stay that way.97
But this is what we are asked to do every time a company asks for consent
to collect and process our data. Even on good days where people are feeling
sharp and contemplative, they are asked to construct scenarios where the
granting of consent might come back to bite them or somehow be used in
an adverse way against them. But unlike playing football or having surgery,
where at least people can get a ballpark sense of risk through guestimation,

95.
Woodrow Hartzog, User Agreements are Betraying You, MEDIUM (June 5, 2018), https://med
ium.com/s/trustissues/user-agreements-are-betraying-you-19db7135441f
[https://perma.cc/2MWQJCJC].
96.
See, e.g., Caroline Beaton, Humans Are Bad at Predicting Futures That Don’t Benefit Them,
ATLANTIC (Nov. 2, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/11/humans-are-bad-atpredicting-futures-that-dont-benefit-them/544709/ [https://perma.cc/4NPP-KHQG]; Kate Morgan, Why
You’re So Bad at Predicting the Future, MEDIUM (Jan. 3, 2019), https://medium.com/s/2069/why-youreso-bad-at-predicting-the-future-68e14a5f41a4 [https://perma.cc/3SKY-CXN5]; Bruce Schneier, Why
the Human Brain is a Poor Judge of Risk, WIRED (Mar. 22, 2007), https://www.wired.com/2007/03
/security-matters0322/ [https://perma.cc/4PLD-DQQ7].
97.
See Beaton, supra note 96.
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there’s an entire universe of consequences that most people don’t even think
about when asked for consent to data practices.
Privacy—the rules governing human information—is valuable because
it helps protect against a wide array of harms. Privacy protects against so
many harms, in fact, that it can be easy to overlook them. Some harms occur
far downstream from the points of salience for people, like the point of
collection, initial disclosure, or data breach. Consider consent to things like
biometrics, particularly facial recognition technology.98 These surveillance
technologies intuitively implicate the dangers of surveillance: the chilling
effect of being watched and a generalized fear of retaliation or adverse
consequences that might follow.99 But many of the harms of facial
recognition might not immediately spring to mind when people ask for
consent to use this technology. People’s faceprints can make harassment
and stalking easier.100 They can gradually shift communally supported due
process values like “presumed innocent” to “people who have yet to be
found guilty of a crime.”101 They can facilitate the suffocation that follows
when rules are perfectly enforced.102 They can reduce the cost of sorting,
categorizing, discriminating, and denying opportunities, benefits, or needed
support and treatment in furtherance of surveillance capitalism.103
Data analytics and advertising surveillance can also involve this kind of
unwitting consent. For example, consider how many times people are asked
to click “I agree” to certain advertising technologies. There are credible
allegations that the process used to target advertisements to internet users
98.
Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Facial Recognition is the Perfect Tool for Oppression,
MEDIUM (Aug. 2, 2018), https://medium.com/s/story/facial-recognition-is-the-perfect-tool-for-oppressi
on-bc2a08f0fe66 [https://perma.cc/45RL-6HXD].
99.
See Neil Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934 (2013).
100. See Kevin Rothrock, Facial Recognition Service Becomes a Weapon Against Russian Porn
Actresses, ARS TECHNICA (Apr. 26, 2016), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/04/facial-recogniti
on-service-becomes-a-weapon-against-russian-porn-actresses/ [https://perma.cc/F4HG-6SXF].
101. Anne-Marie Slaughter & Stephanie Hare, Our Bodies or Ourselves, PROJECT SYNDICATE
(July 23, 2018), https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/dangers-of-biometric-data-by-annemarie-sla ughter-and-stephanie-hare-2018-07?barrier=accesspaylog [https://perma.cc/4N8L-8FC9].
102. See Tara Francis Chan, 22 Eerie Photos Show How China Uses Facial Recognition to Track
Its Citizens as They Travel, Shop—And Even Use Toilet Paper, BUSINESS INSIDER (Feb. 12, 2018),
http://www.businessinsider.com/how-china-uses-facial-recognition-technology-surveillance-2018-2
[http://perma.cc /TE5E-3HVX].
103. See SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A
HUMAN FUTURE AT THE NEW FRONTIER OF POWER (2018); Shoshana Zuboff, Big Other: Surveillance
Capitalism and the Prospects of an Information Civilization, 30 J. INFO. TECH. 75 (2015); Clare Garvie
& Jonathan Frankle, Facial-Recognition Software Might Have a Racial Bias Problem, ATLANTIC (Apr.
7, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/04/the-underlying-bias-of-facial-recog
nition-systems/47699 1/ [https://perma.cc/N64Q-ZYG7].

1486

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 96:1461

based upon surveillance of their reading habits allows inferences (and
targeting) based upon sensitive characteristics, such as race, sexual
orientation, health, pregnancy status, and other factors.104 The possibly
apocryphal big data anecdote that is now infamous in tech circles involves
a story in the New York Times Magazine describing how retail giant Target
was able to use a young woman’s purchase history and other seemingly
benign pieces of information to accurately guess that she was pregnant (and
subsequently send her targeted advertisements) before the teenager’s father
found out.105 In any event, predictive analytics are no doubt outstripping
most peoples’ notions of what is capable with data.106 Asking people to
consent to risks that seem like science fiction is another example of
consent’s sickness. But the bottom line remains that much if not most
consent in the digital context suffers from the pathology of unwitting
consent.
B. Coerced Consent
Sometimes a choice is not really a choice; it can be an unpleasant game
of “would you rather” with a choice between a bad option and a terrible one.
This is the problem of coerced consent, a choice that takes the “voluntary”
out of “knowing and voluntary.” Coerced consent can occur, for example,
where a person is confronted with a choice between consent and the loss of
an important asset such as their life or their job. “Coercion” is of course a
provocative term. We use it intentionally here to describe a number of cases
on the continuum from fully “voluntary” consent to truly involuntary “sign
or die” consent. The closer we get to “sign or die,” the more coercive a
consent will be. While this category might include traditional forms of
coercion that would invalidate agreements under the doctrine of duress,
mediated environments that manufacture consent can also be coercive in
more manipulative and subtle ways.

104. See Natasha Tiku, Privacy Groups Claim Online Ads Can Target Abuse Victims, WIRED (Jan.
27, 2019), https://www.wired.com/story/privacy-groups-claim-online-ads-can-target-abuse-victims/ [ht
tps://perma.cc/AE4D-8T4V].
105. Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&hp [https
://perma.cc/K247-ZGHZ]; see also Kashmir Hill, How Target Figured Out a Teen Girl Was Pregnant
Before Her Father Did, FORBES (Feb. 16, 2012), https://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2012/02/16/
how-target-figured-out-a-teen-girl-was-pregnant-before-her-father-did/#7f3530266686 [https://perma.c
c/B7FJ-7JX7].
106. See, e.g., Hideyuki Matsumi, Predictions and Privacy: Should There Be Rules About Using
Personal Data to Forecast the Future?, 48 CUMB. LAW REV. 149, 159–69 (2017).
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Like the case of unwitting consent, coerced consent uses the language of
gold standard consent to obscure unpleasant consequences. For example, in
2017 the U.S. Congress eliminated Obama Administration privacy
protections limiting what cable providers like Verizon and Comcast could
do with consumer internet browsing history. At a town meeting with
constituents, Congressman James Sensenbrenner declared that when it
comes to ISP privacy:
Nobody's got to use the Internet. . . . Internet companies have invested
an awful lot of money in having almost universal service now. The
fact is that, you know, I don't think it's my job to tell you that you
cannot get advertising for your information being sold. My job, I
think, is to tell you that you have the opportunity to do it, and then
you take it upon yourself to make that choice. . . . [sic] That’s what
the law has been, and I think we ought to have more choices rather
than fewer choices with the government controlling our everyday
lives.107
When pressed for clarification by the press, Sensenbrenner’s office
explained that “people can choose whether or not they want to use certain
websites. For instance, in using Facebook, people have the option to agree
(or not agree) with its terms of agreement, which covers what kind of
information the social media site collects from its users.”108
There are of course obvious problems with this logic—the very logic that
has been used by industry and regulators to avoid meaningful privacy
regulation in the United States for decades. First, to “choose” not to use the
Internet is in a very real sense to “choose” not to participate in modern
society or the modern economy. This might not quite be “sign or die,” but
it’s close to “sign or not live like most people.” Second, when it comes to
Internet Service Providers, consumers often face no practical choice
between providers. ISPs like Comcast or Verizon often operate in virtual or
actual monopolies for broadband services. To “choose” not to use one’s
monopolist cable company for wired broadband is functionally to “choose”
once again not to use the Internet at home. (Good luck streaming Netflix on
your phone data plan.) Third, even with respect to individual services at the
platform layer, there is once again a paucity of choice. If you want to use
social networking to connect to your friends or family, Facebook is often
107. Kristine Phillips, ‘Nobody’s Got to Use the Internet’: GOP Lawmaker Who Voted to Scrape
Web Privacy Rules, CHICAGO TRIB. (Apr. 15, 2017), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworl
d/politics/ct-sensenbrenner-web-privacy-20170415-story.html [https://perma.cc/JZS9-AZSS].
108. Id.
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the only real choice. And even if your friends are on Instagram, Facebook
(and its data practices) own that too.
Our point is that most consumers in the digital environment have highly
limited options for consent, much less for bargaining. This is particularly
the case where monopoly power or something like it applies. Even where
there is some choice among services (Lyft versus Uber, for example), those
services may offer functionally identical data terms. Finally, even where
there is “choice” among alternatives, this is by no means the end of the ways
in which firms can structure, influence, and nudge consumer choice in ways
they desire. The coercion continuum is a function not only of the market
power of companies, but also of those companies’ power over the design of
interfaces to shape and to influence consumer decision-making. This results
in “dark patterns,” a term coined by user experience designer Harry
Brignull. According to Brignull, dark patterns are “tricks used in websites
and apps that make you buy or sign up for things that you didn't mean to.”109
Security researcher Greg Conti calls these patterns “malicious” or “evil
interfaces.”110 Conti and Edward Sobiesk define malicious interfaces simply
as those that “deliberately violate usable design best practices in order to
manipulate, exploit, or attack the user.”111 And they are everywhere.
Common examples of malicious interfaces include “disabled back
buttons, browsers with ‘sponsored’ default bookmarks, unexpected and
unnecessary forms, blinking advertisements, and pop-ups covering desired
content.”112 These malicious interfaces often coerce users into disclosing
private information.113 Conti and Sobiesk identified eleven kinds of
malicious interfaces:
Coercion – Threatening or mandating the user’s compliance.
109.
110.

DARK PATTERNS, https://darkpatterns.org/ [https://perma.cc/7322-X5ME].
Gregory Conti & Edward Sobiesk, Malicious Interface Design: Exploiting the User, 2010
WORLD
WIDE
WEB
CONFERENCE
271,
271
(2010),
http://www.gregconti.com/publications/201004_malchi.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5HN4-HUWY]
[hereinafter Conti & Sobiesk, Malicious Interface Design] (arguing that security and human-computer
interaction committees need to come together to fix deceptive designs); see also Tim Jones, Facebook’s
‘Evil
Interfaces,’
ELEC.
FRONTIER
FOUND.
(Apr.
29,
2010),
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/04/facebooks-evil-interfaces [https://perma.cc/PQT6-MSEV].
111. Conti & Sobiesk, Malicious Interface Design, supra note 110, at 271 (arguing that security
and human-computer interaction committees need to come together to fix deceptive designs).
112. Gregory Conti & Edward Sobiesk, Malicious Interfaces and Personalization’s Uninviting
Future, IEEE COMPUT. SOC’Y & RELIABILITY SOC’Y 72, 72 (May/June 2009),
http://www.rumint.org/gregconti/publications/j3pri.pdf [https://perma.cc/WWD2-S6B5] [hereinafter
Conti & Sobiesk, Malicious Interfaces and Personalization’s Uninviting Future] (noting that many
individuals are tricked or coerced into divulging information they do not intend or do not want to
divulge).
113. Id.
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Confusion – Asking the user questions or providing information that
they do not understand.
Distraction – Attracting the user’s attention away from their current
task by exploiting perception, particularly pre-attentive processing.
Exploiting Errors – Taking advantage of user errors to facilitate the
interface designer’s goals.
Forced Work – Deliberately increasing work for the user.
Interruption – Interrupting the user’s task flow.
Manipulating Navigation – Creating information architectures and
navigation mechanisms that guide the user toward interface designer
task accomplishment.
Obfuscation – Hiding desired information and interface elements.
Restricting Functionality – Limiting or omitting controls that would
facilitate user task accomplishment.
Shock – Presenting disturbing content to the user.
Trick – Misleading the user or other attempts at deception.114
Because companies have strong incentives to obtain consent, it is no
surprise many of these malicious interfaces are used to coerce, wheedle, and
manipulate people to grant it. Examples ranging in severity abound. Some
terms of use agreements just won’t let you say no. They only let you put off
saying yes until “later.” Other kinds of mediated consent leverage
psychological pressure to manufacture consent. Consider the concept of
what Brignull calls “confirmshaming,” that is, “the act of guilting the user
into opting into something. The option to decline is worded in such a way
as to shame the user into compliance.”115 Consider the request from
MyMedic to send users notifications, which forces those who do not wish
to receive notification to click a button labeled “no, I prefer to bleed to
death.”116 It’s a subtle form of psychological coercion, but at scale these
attempts can deplete our resolve.
114. Conti & Sobiesk, Malicious Interface Design, supra note 110, at 273.
115. Confirmshaming, DARKPATTERNS, https://darkpatterns.org/types-of-dark-pattern/confirmsh
aming [https://perma.cc/5BEZ-RCQL]; see also Confirmshaming, TUMBLR http://confirmshaming.tumb
lr.com/ [https://perma.cc/K8UA-N963].
116. MYMEDIC, https://mymedic.com/ [https://perma.cc/TZY3-HCTG].
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Other examples abound. “Roach motels” make it easy to enroll or give
consent, but difficult to leave.117 “Forced continuity” quietly extends your
consent past initial authorizations with affirmative opt-out obligations.118
While Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein’s book Nudge offered an optimistic
account of how to use the insights of behavioral economics to influence
“choice architecture” for social good through what they called “benevolent
paternalism,” many tech companies today seem to be using it as a cookbook
for coercive and manipulative decision structures.119
C. Incapacitated Consent
The third pathology of consent is incapacitated consent. Like coerced
consent, incapacitated consent takes the “voluntary” out of “knowing and
voluntary,” but in this case it does so as a matter of law rather than as a
matter of circumstance. Incapacitated consents are those where
voluntariness is simply not available as a matter of law, such as with
children and others who are categorically incapable of legally consenting.
While incapacitated consent may be the easiest of the pathologies to
understand, here, too, some examples will help to illuminate the problem.
Laws in the United States and Europe have regulated the ways in which
companies can collect data about children for some time, though with
limited effectiveness.120 For example, the one area in which the United
States has a generally applicable Internet data protection regime is the
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA), which
regulates online data collection from children. Yet even though the general
age of contractual consent in the United States is 18, COPPA only regulates
collection from children under the age of 13.121 This means that even though
children from 13–18 are legally incapable of contractual consent, it is
perfectly legal to treat them as consenting adults for data collection purposes
under the prevailing “notice and consent” regime.122
117. Types of Dark Pattern, DARKPATTERNS, https://darkpatterns.org/types-of-dark-pattern
[https://perma.cc/G89G-FZDN].
118. Id.
119. See RICHARD R. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT
HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008); see also Conti & Sobiesk, Malicious Interfaces and
Personalization’s Uninviting Future, supra note 112.
120. See Simone van der Hof, I Agree, Or Do I? A Rights-Based Analysis of the Law on Children’s
Consent in the Digital World, 34 WIS. INT’L L.J. 409, 412, 425 (2016).
121. 5 U.S.C. §§ 6501–6505 (2019); 16 C.F.R. § 312.2 (2018).
122. While an amendment to COPPA has been proposed that contains additional protections, the
statute would still heavily rely upon consent. See Makena Kelly, New Privacy Bill Would Give Parents
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In practice, moreover, whether legally or illegally, it has been trivially
easy to circumvent the consent of legally incapacitated minors in ways that
have led to serious financial and even physical harm. For example, both
Apple and Facebook have come under fire for making it too easy for
children to run up large debts in app stores or in-app purchases using their
parents’ credit cards.123 More recently, the dating apps Tinder and Grindr
were investigated by the UK government after police investigated more than
thirty cases of child rape resulting from children avoiding the age checks on
the application interfaces.124 Companies may protest after such incidents
that they do not intend minors to use their services (and that they put in place
measures to forestall this). However, the combination of easy-to-install
applications and a permissive regulatory regime makes it all but inevitable
that minors will use apps and engage in online and offline activities, ranging
from data collection to sex, that they lack the legal capacity to consent to.
Simply put, a notice and choice regime coupled with the general goal of
“putting users in control” cannot solve the problem of incapacitated consent.
While the Mark Zuckerbergs of the world might lionize control and
consent, the digital consumers of the world face a very different reality than
the idealized one presented by the CEOs and marketing departments of
technology companies. The idealized model paints a picture of consent that
evokes the knowing and voluntary gold standard, and relies upon the gold
standard’s power for its legitimacy. In practice, however, the version of
consent that most consumers face is a significant and pathological departure
from the gold standard. Unwitting consent takes the “knowing” out of
“knowing and voluntary;” coerced and incapacitated consent take the
“voluntary” out of “knowing and voluntary.” Our articulation of this
vocabulary for pathologies of consent is intended to provide a useful way to
identify and critique the ways in which consents in practice fall short of the
gold standard in theory. Once we can identify the problems, we will be
better placed to prescribe solutions, and it is to this that we now turn.
an ‘Eraser Button’ and Ban Ads Targeting Children, VERGE (Mar. 12, 2019), https://www.theverge.co
m/2019/3/12/18261181/eraser-button-bill-children-privacy-coppa-hawley-markey [https://perma.cc/U
U9X-LLG7].
123. See Nathan Halverson, Facebook Knowingly Duped Game-Playing Kids and Their Parents
Out of Money, REVEAL NEWS (Jan. 24, 2019), https://www.revealnews.org/article/facebook-knowinglyduped-game-playing-kids-and-their-parents-out-of-money/ [https://perma.cc/4KLK-7QTR]; Press
Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Apple Inc. Will Provide Full Consumer Refunds of at Least $32.5 Million
to Settle FTC Complaint It Charged for Kids’ In-App Purchases Without Parental Consent (Jan. 15,
2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/01/apple-inc-will-provide-full-consumer-r
efunds-least-325-million [https://perma.cc/P5UJ-4E2R].
124. See Ben Quinn, Tinder and Grindr Face Questions Over Age Checks After Rape Cases,
GUARDIAN (Feb. 10, 2019), https://www.theguardian.com/society/2019/feb/10/tinder-and-grindr-facequestions-over-age-checks-children [https://perma.cc/Z5ED-8NKK].
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III. IDEAL CIRCUMSTANCES FOR CONSENT
Although the notion of informed consent in digital environments is
deeply problematic, it could still play an important role under the right
circumstances. The key is to understand the conditions under which consent
can meaningfully enhance autonomy and self-determination. Of course, as
discussed above, the foundational notion of informed consent to data
practices is that it must be “freely given, specific, informed and
unambiguous.” This includes notions of voluntariness and revocability.
However, we contend that the problem with consent for data practices
isn’t necessarily in the form or substance of the consent itself. Many
scholars have examined how to substantively improve requests for informed
consent.125 But an additional, sometimes fatal, problem lies with the
circumstances in which consent is given. Informed consent is only useful in
particular contexts. If the circumstances and structure under which consent
is asked and given are wrong, that consent will be ineffective even if it is
“freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous.” In this Part, we
propose three circumstances necessary for an ideal environment for
effective consent. To be meaningful, requests for consent must be
infrequent, the risks of giving consent must be vivid and easy to envision,
and data subjects must have an incentive to take each request seriously.
Sadly, these conditions are scarce in modern data exchanges, but we believe
that identifying the problems consumers face in these transactions allows us
to identify the contexts in which consent can do valuable and legitimate
work.
A. Infrequent Requests
One key to understanding why the pathologies of consent to data
practices are so problematic in the digital environment is the fact that there
are no limits on the number of requests for consent. Every day, every digital
consumer is implicitly or explicitly asked to consent to data collection and
processing practices for many, if not most, of the websites they visit, the
online accounts they create, the services they sign up for, and the apps they
use. Consider your web browsing on laptop and phone, GPS navigation,
search engines, smartphone operating systems, social networks, taxi
services, travel booking, video and audio streaming services, and all of the
125. See, e.g., Florian Schaub, Rebecca Balebako, Adam Durity & Lorrie Faith Cranor, A Design
Space for Effective Privacy Notices, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CONSUMER PRIVACY 365 (Evan
Selinger et al. eds., 2018); Batya Friedman, Peyina Lin & Jessica K. Miller, Informed Consent by Design,
in SECURITY AND USABILITY 495 (Lorrie Faith Cranor & Simson Garfinkel eds., 2005).
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other “free” or paid services you use which serve you ads or otherwise
collect your data. The result is a casual familiarity turned ennui that leads
us to gloss over the terms because we know that another request is just
around the corner. Because each consent request is a drain on our time and
cognitive load, we wisely choose to conserve our efforts. As one of us has
written elsewhere,
Anyone that has turned off notifications for apps like Facebook’s
Messenger can attest to the relentless, grinding requests for the user
to turn them back on almost every time the app is opened. Many can
relate to the experience of a child asking for candy, over and over,
until the requests become too much to ignore and we give in, simply
to quiet them. Willpower can feel like a finite, vulnerable, and
subjective resource, and systems are designed to deplete and erode it.
Once our willpower and ability to make choices has been
compromised, the control users have been given is meaningless.126
Compare this depressing state of affairs to environments with informed
consent, such as medical treatment, clinical trials, surgeries, and scientific
research. Request for consent to these practices do not come often, by sheer
virtue of the fact that treatment and trials are relatively uncommon.
Thankfully, surgery is not a daily routine. This provides a necessary
downtime and the space to both take consent requests seriously and go about
living the rest of our lives. People have the ability to consider informed
consent to surgery carefully because they know that they will not be asked
for consent to another surgery in a few minutes. Critically, if they decline
to give consent to a surgery, people know that they won’t be pestered again
and again until they say yes. Necessary medical intervention is something
of a flashpoint in time: people either agree or don’t agree to treatment and
then get on with it. Practically speaking, the very need to ask for consent to
surgery just doesn’t present itself very often.
There is no such practical constraint for consent requests for data
collection and processing. Data collection and sharing in the modern world
is frequent, and is becoming as routine as walking, eating, and breathing.
Data subjects are ceaselessly bombarded with requests for consent. There
are no limits on the number of times a company is allowed to ask for a
126. See, e.g., Hartzog, The Case Against Idealising Control, supra note 49, at 429 (footnote
omitted) (citing AM. PSYCHOL. ASSOC., WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT WILLPOWER: THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE OF SELF-CONTROL (2012), https://www.apa.org/helpcenter/willpower.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A2DH-QBE8]); John Tierney, Do You Suffer From Decision Fatigue?, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 17, 2011), https://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/21/magazine/do-you-suffer-from-decision-fa
tigue.html [https://perma.cc/LJ68-4MJ6].
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person’s consent, and there are no limits on the number of companies that
may simultaneously ask for it. Even if we could consider each individual
request rationally, our cognitive bandwidth is overwhelmed.
If consent is to be effective, it must happen infrequently. This means hard
choices regarding which requests are more important than others and which
kinds of companies should be prioritized. This might feel inherently
paternalistic. Who are lawmakers to demote the importance of particular
requests? But when all consent requests are important, none of them are.
Failing to limit who can ask for informed consent, when they can ask, and
how many times ignores the reality that people need time and space if their
choices are to be meaningful. When choices are too frequent, consent loses
its moral legitimacy as a justification for action.
B. Vivid Risks
At the JFK Medical Center, the consent form for open heart surgery
explicitly states that the risks for the procedure include “bleeding requiring
blood transfusion or return to surgery for repair, nerve damage, heart, liver,
kidney or lung complication and/or even in rare cases death.”127 That’s
serious stuff. But the list goes on, including “complications arising in the
post-operative period preventing normal recuperation. . . . [including] long
term ventilation, confusion, fluid accumulation of the lungs, pneumonia,
cardiac arrhythmias, fever and abnormal laboratory results. Also infection,
long term healing and/or scarring of the surgical site incisions may occur
and may require further treatment including surgical repair.”128
Scars, bleeding, fluid accumulation, and death. These are vivid—and
thus easy—risks for us to envision. So is the risk of consenting to things like
government searches, which might result in imprisonment. These risks
might even be too vivid, as once we’ve thought of them they can be difficult
to push out of our heads.129 We even consent to accept the risk of harm in
everyday goods and services like rental car agreements that hold the driver
127. JFK MEDICAL CENTER, CONSENT FORM FOR OPEN HEART SURGERY 1, https://jfkmc.com/uti
l/forms/Consent-for-Open-Heart-Surgery.pdf [https://perma.cc/QA4V-GKLC].
128. Id.
129. Cf. KAHNEMAN, supra note 62, at 326 (discussing experimental research suggesting that such
so-called “vivid” outcomes tend to be viewed as more likely by human brains than a strict rationality
calculus would suggest). One of the ongoing debates for informed consent to surgery is that the more
vivid risks, even if incredibly unlikely, might have undue sway over a patient’s decision. See David
Thomasma, Telling the Truth to Patients: A Clinical Ethics Exploration, 3 CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE
ETHICS 375 (1994).
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responsible for losses or dry cleaners who limit liability for damage to
clothes to things like replacing or repairing. But personal data is different
from bodily integrity or damage to our liberty or property. The risks of data
practices are so opaque that there’s an ongoing debate as to whether they
should even be legally recognized.130 Certain kinds of surveillance and data
practices might be “creepy,” but that’s the word we use when we have
difficulty specifying exactly the risks we are facing.131 In fact, most of the
risks we face from modern data practices arrive not with a bang but a
whimper, if we hear them at all. Information is accumulated bit by bit, with
risk accruing incrementally. This makes envisioning the plethora of harms
difficult because there is rarely a single moment in time that people can
point to when the envisioned risk materializes. Unlike severed arteries and
being put in prison, how can people envision “databases of ruin” that have
reached the critical mass of jeopardy?132 Informed consent regimes for data
will only work if the risks are vivid.
Even worse, these risks that we are being asked to waive through consent
might materialize without our even knowing it. People typically know when
they have a heart attack or suffer complications from surgery or
pharmaceuticals. But our data could be being used against us this very
moment, and we wouldn’t know it. Hackers could, right now, be opening
credit cards in your name as a result of that data breach last year that you
didn’t know you were involved in either. That lack of feedback further
frustrates our ability to adequately envision the risks. Even when
manifested, data harms often stay hidden. And our risk calculus is further
funneled into wild speculation, paranoia, or overconfidence.
Of course, some data-related harms are easy to envision, such as being
humiliated because a deeply-held secret is revealed, having your identity
stolen, or being fired or denied insurance coverage on the basis of a personal
data dossier or big data prediction. But the problem is that these harms are
difficult to predict and difficult to trace from particular disclosures of
information. This leads us to our final pre-condition for gold standard
consent.

130. See, e.g., M. Ryan Calo, The Boundaries of Privacy Harm, 86 IND. L.J. 1 (2011) (offering a
theory of privacy harm as legally-cognizable); Daniel Solove & Danielle Keats Citron, Risk & Anxiety:
A Theory of Data Breach Harms, 96 TEX. L. REV. 737 (2018) (same).
131. Evan Selinger, Why Do We Love to Call New Technologies “Creepy?,” SLATE (Aug. 22,
2012), https://slate.com/technology/2012/08/facial-recognition-software-targeted-advertising-we-loveto-call-new-technologies-creepy.html [https://perma.cc/KXT6-7UMY]; see also Richards & Hartzog,
Taking Trust Seriously, supra note 3.
132. Paul Ohm, Don’t Build a Database of Ruin, HARV. BUS. REV. (Aug. 23, 2012), https://hbr.org
/2012/08/dont-build-a-database-of-ruin [https://perma.cc/G2MS-QR48].
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C. Incentives to Take Each Request Seriously
Certain decisions demand to be taken seriously. The reason people
hesitate before consenting to skydiving and surgery is that if it goes wrong,
they could die. Mental and physical safety are powerful motivators to
understand the risks of particular decisions. Imprisonment and exoneration
are powerful motivators to weigh when granting consent to government
searches. Even some frequent decisions to grant consent demand to be taken
seriously, like participating in sports involving physical contact. It’s not just
that the choices are infrequent and the risks are vivid. It’s that for gold
standard consent there must be a clear incentive to critically analyze and
deliberate the request for consent because of the magnitude of the stakes
involved and the close relationship between the consent and those stakes.
Requests for informed consent are, by definition, individualized and
atomized. The moral weight of these frameworks is concentrated in the
information delivered to the subject and the subject’s voluntary execution
of a legally significant choice. Through this call and response, people’s
autonomy is ostensibly respected, which can justify a host of actions that
would otherwise be objectionable. But these justifications break down when
people have little incentive to meaningfully consider what is being asked of
them. This incentive can be diminished either because the stakes appear
insignificant or because people cannot easily see how their decision is
consequential because the relationship between the consent and the risks is
too remote. Others simply have little incentive to take each request seriously
because they feel powerless.133
Consider the common fatalistic sentiment that privacy is already dead.134
Ian Bogost argues that it’s hopeless to try and opt out of surveillance
capitalism, proclaiming that “the age of privacy nihilism is here.”135 Bogost
133. Kimberlee Morrison, Pew: Internet Users Feel Powerless Against Digital Data Mining,
ADWEEK (Nov. 12, 2014), https://www.adweek.com/digital/pew-internet-users-feel-powerless-digitaldata-mining/ [https://perma.cc/manage/create?folder=4014-40406-40412-48449] (describing PEW
RESEARCH CTR., PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF PRIVACY AND SECURITY IN THE POST-SNOWDEN ERA (Nov.
12, 2014), https://www.pewinternet.org/2014/11/12/public-privacy-perceptions/ [perma.cc/6VDK5UFP]); Brian Byer, Internet Users Worry About Online Privacy But Feel Powerless to Do Much About
It, ENTREPRENEUR (June 20, 2018), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/314524 [https://perma.cc/2Y
R6-ZLQS].
134. See Neil M. Richards, Four Privacy Myths, in A WORLD WITHOUT PRIVACY: WHAT LAW
CAN AND SHOULD DO? 33 (Austin Sarat ed., 2015) (debunking the “Privacy is Dead” myth).
135. See Ian Bogost, Welcome to the Age of Privacy Nihilism, ATLANTIC (Aug. 23, 2018),
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2018/08/the-age-of-privacy-nihilism-is-here/568198/
[https://perma.cc/A83C-GEJE].
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paints a bleak picture, in which “[e]verything you have done has been
recorded, munged, and spat back at you to benefit sellers, advertisers, and
the brokers who service them. It has been for a long time, and it’s not going
to stop.”136
It’s hard to blame anyone who feels this way, even if there’s so much
privacy left to fight for.137 Tech companies are now the backbone of the
American economy. They are multi-billion dollar companies that have their
fingers in nearly every aspect of our lives. Even if people were merely
skeptical of the tech giants with the most personal data, sometimes called
the “Big Five” (Amazon, Google, Facebook, Apple, and Microsoft), people
would likely find it difficult, if not impossible, to live a normal, modern life
without interacting with them.138 For the ninety-one percent of Americans
that feel that they have lost control over their data, why should any single
request for consent compel any forethought at all?139 Under this view, our
consent is a fait accompli—something to quickly agree to without
deliberation, because there is little point in resistance.
Another way consent can break down is it can be very difficult to draw
a line from the practices that need consent to the stakes of the decision. Data
harms, unlike physical harms, are not localized. They occur offstage and far
away, on servers in remote countries and in boardrooms in faraway cities.
The Internet is littered with infographics attempting to chart the flow of data
from users to platforms to third party vendors and onward downstream.140
The expanse of it all is mind boggling. In this light, data subjects have little
reason to avoid clicking “I agree” because the services they are using are
local, such as the Facebook or Uber app, and the risks are remote, such as
unobserved data flows on the other side of the world. Again, people would
have little incentive to deliberate because, frankly, they have little notion of
the stakes, and the benefits of consent are right at their fingertips.
Finally, consent justifications are weakened when each particular request
is just one tiny piece of the larger risk puzzle. Our consent to data practices
136. Id.
137. Evan Selinger, Stop Saying Privacy is Dead, MEDIUM (Oct. 11, 2018), https://medium.com/s/
story/stop-saying-privacy-is-dead-513dda573071 [https://perma.cc/WD74-6DUZ].
138. For an in-depth exploration of the difficulties of escaping the Big Five, see Kashmir Hill,
Life Without the Tech Giants, GIZMODO (Jan. 22, 2019), https://gizmodo.com/life-without-the-tech-giant
s-1830258056 [https://perma.cc/2P4E-E9J6].
139. See Kimberlee Morrison, Pew: Internet Users Feel Powerless Against Digital Data Mining,
ADWEEK (Nov. 12, 2014), https://www.adweek.com/digital/pew-internet-users-feel-powerless-digitaldata-mining/ [https://perma.cc/2SNP-F296].
140. See, e.g., ImBrentJames, A Healthcare Data Flow Diagram Showing the Complexity That
TKY Could Help Simplify, REDDIT (Aug. 2017), https://www.reddit.com/r/THEKEYOFFICIAL/comme
nts/99q4ny/a_healthcare_data_flow_diagram_showing_the/ [https://perma.cc/2V22-98M4].
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is astonishingly dispersed. Thousands of apps and services ask us for small,
incremental disclosures, few of which involve the kind of information
collection that might give people pause. While dating apps and platforms
that collect sensitive and large amounts of personal data might cause some
people to consider their risks, it’s not as though people share all their
information at once. Instead, it trickles out over time, such that our
incentives to deliberate at the point of agreement are small because we don’t
know how much information we will ultimately end up sharing. Most of the
time, it probably seems like a small amount. This is like the problem of
death by a thousand cuts. And there’s little guidance for people regarding
which individual cuts matter. So people make the transaction-rational
decision to chalk up each individual request for consent as “no big deal” in
perpetuity. Such an environment is no place to condition our well-being.
Finally, people don’t have great incentives to weigh the externalities of
consent. That is, typically people only consider how a particular consentedto action will affect themselves. By allowing consent to companies to collect
and process my data, those companies can then better target ads to everyone
else who uses the service. One person’s data becomes a point of comparison
that allows for refined targeting, processing, and use elsewhere in the
system. People probably don’t take into account this externality when
deciding whether to agree or not to give consent for data processing. There
just aren’t enough incentives for people to consider the implications of data
processing for other people on a consistent basis, which creates a collective
action problem, another pathology of consent to data practices to add to the
list.
IV. BEYOND CONSENT
America desperately needs a new direction for its privacy rules. Notions
of consent, control, and transparency have dominated data protection
discussions for years, and the result is a sea of “I agree” buttons, drop-down
menus, and switches that we are unable to navigate.141
In terms of meaningfully protecting our privacy, this approach has been
a spectacular failure. The shortcomings of consent and transparency are
141. We have offered a preliminary version of these thoughts here: Woodrow Hartzog & Neil
Richards, It’s Time to Try Something Different on Internet Privacy, WASH. POST (Dec. 20, 2018), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/its-time-to-try-something-different-on-internet-privacy/2018/12/2
0/bc1d71c0-0315-11e9-9122-82e98f91ee6f_story.html?utm_term=.5cd05e778a52 [https://perma.cc/F6
7G-DF5Y].

2019]

THE PATHOLOGIES OF DIGITAL CONSENT

1499

particularly visible in the United States. Congress is still trying to settle on
its approach to privacy, but most of the current proposals still build off the
notice and choice model.142 The FTC has made a heroic effort to be the top
U.S. privacy cop, but it has been starved of the legal tools and financial
resources it needs to do a proper job.
America has a bad reputation for privacy.143 The world is watching and
judging, and the economic stakes are enormous. International data flows are
essential for the global economy to function without fundamentally—and
expensively—restructuring the Internet to America’s huge financial
detriment. American tech companies depend on being able to smoothly
import European data for processing. But, in 2015, a European Court ruled
that America’s privacy protections were so poor that it struck down the
“Safe Harbor” agreement, which helped enable an international flow of
data.144 Our current data sharing agreement with Europe, called the EU/U.S.
“Privacy Shield,” is in jeopardy.145 If it fails, we will need a good
replacement.
Europe and others have encouraged the U.S. to adopt a law similar to the
EU’s new General Data Protection Regulation. But a “U.S. GDPR” seems
destined to suffer from the same consent pathologies we have explored in
this article. As discussed above, the GDPR and forthcoming ePrivacy
directive borrow too heavily from the control and transparency playbook.

142. CAMERON F. KERRY, BROOKINGS INSTITUTE, BREAKING DOWN PROPOSALS FOR PRIVACY
LEGISLATION: HOW DO THEY REGULATE? (Mar. 8, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/breakin
g-down-proposals-for-privacy-legislation-how-do-they-regulate/
[https://perma.cc/QGR9-FUYL];
CAMERON F. KERRY, BROOKINGS INSTITUTE, WHY PROTECTING PRIVACY IS A LOSING GAME TODAY—
AND HOW TO CHANGE THE GAME (July 12, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/why-protectin
g-privacy-is-a-losing-game-today-and-how-to-change-the-game/
[https://perma.cc/5HVK-FLHS];
CONSUMERS INT'L, THE STATE OF DATE PROTECTION RULES AROUND THE WORLD (2018), https://ww
w.consumersinternational.org/media/155133/gdpr-briefing.pdf [https://perma.cc/6N5L-DRLR].
143. MARY MADDEN, PEW RESEARCH CTR., PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF PRIVACY AND SECURITY IN
THE POST-SNOWDEN ERA (Nov. 12, 2014), https://www.pewinternet.org/2014/11/12/public-privacy-per
ceptions/ [perma.cc/6VDK-5UFP]; Copy That: America Should Borrow From Europe's Data-Privacy
Law, ECONOMIST (Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2018/04/05/america-shouldborro w-from-europes-data-privacy-law [https://perma.cc/RKM2-3ENN]; Samuel Gibbs, What Is 'Safe
Harbour' and Why Did the EUCJ Just Declare It Invalid?, GUARDIAN (Oct. 6, 2015), https://www.thegu
ardian.com/technology/2015/oct/06/safe-harbour-european-court-declare-invalid-data-protection [https
://perma.cc/B4PS-SFV8].
144. See Ellen Nakashima, Top E.U. Court Strikes Down Major Data-Sharing Pact Between U.S.
and Europe, WASH. POST (Oct. 6, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/eucourt-strikes-down-safe-harbor-data-transfer-deal-over-privacy-concerns/2015/10/06/2da2d9f6-6c2a-1
1e5-b31c-d80d62b53e28_story.html?utm_term=.9ac8bcde9495 [https://perma.cc/SUK3-WD6M].
145. See Hayley Evans & Shannon Togawa Mercer, Privacy Shield on Shaky Ground: What’s Up
With EU-U.S. Data Privacy Regulations, LAWFARE (Sept. 2, 2018, 2:31 PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/privacy-shield-shaky-ground-whats-eu-us-data-privacy-regulations
[https://perma.cc/895C-Y3EW].
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Our current approach too often results in nothing more than cluttered
minds and inboxes, with people resigned to take-it-or-leave it choices for
ad-supported web or social media. Relying upon consent to justify data
practices rests on the dubious assumptions that people understand what they
are being told, and we can meaningfully calculate the risk of our choices
online and exercise agency through mediated technologies.
It should be no wonder that under this framework, privacy—our human
information policy—has begun to fall apart, often in breathtaking ways.
We’ve seen a cascade of high-profile privacy failures like the Edward
Snowden disclosures, the Cambridge Analytica scandal, the targeting of
fake news based on data about political preferences, and data breach after
data breach after data breach. Backing this up is an entire ecosystem
dependent upon an illusion of control and wheedling, cajoling, and
extracting consent by any method possible.
In spite of the failures of control and transparency, some lawmakers are
considering doubling down on this failed strategy. But no matter how much
control we are given, it will never work online. As we’ve tried to show in
this essay, consent regimes burden data subjects with all of the risks of
understanding and self-protection while keeping the data machine
humming. Consent does not scale without losing its legitimacy.146 The
control that consent regimes promise us ends up being illusory and
overwhelming. Even when companies are transparent, it doesn’t lead to
reform. Big tech platforms and shadowy advertising companies make their
fortunes while the rest of us are watched, nudged, exploited, and exposed to
data breaches and the manipulation of politics and elections.
There is a better way.
We should have rules that are more sensitive to relationships and power
disparities. One way to do this is for lawmakers to create rules designed to
protect our trust—trust in the Internet, trust in those entities that hold our
data and promise to use it for our benefit, trust in our economy and in our
digital society.147 Being trustworthy in the digital age means being discreet
with our data, honest about the risk of data practices, protective of our
personal information, and, above all, loyal to us, the data subjects.148
There are some indications that lawmakers are willing to consider a trustbased approach to modern privacy rules. In late 2018, U.S. Senator Brian
146.
147.
148.

See, e.g., Julie Cohen, Turning Privacy Inside Out, 20 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1 (2019).
See Richards & Hartzog, Taking Trust Seriously, supra note 3.
Id.
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Schatz introduced the “Data Care Act of 2018.”149 Among other things, the
bill goes beyond control and transparency goals in favor of three key nonwaivable trust-based obligations for companies that use the Internet to
collect personal information about people: duties of care, loyalty, and
confidentiality. These duties are modeled after what is required of those in
a fiduciary relationship, such as a trustee designed to care for a trust on
behalf of a beneficiary, but they would apply more broadly if this bill were
to pass.150 They would require tech companies of all kinds to act more like
doctors than telemarketers.
Trust rules would eschew consent regimes in favor of obligations to be
protective and discrete and refrain from manipulative practices. They would
aim to keep tech companies from elevating their short-term profits over our
long-term interests. And ideally, legislative efforts built around trust would
give regulators the resources they need and prohibit companies from using
dense terms of use agreements to get us to waive those obligations. An
explicit rejection of flimsy “consent” regimes is an important step forward
for American privacy regimes.151 Companies should be obligated to be
trustworthy regardless of what we clicked to “agree” to online.
Another way lawmakers could address some of the pathologies of
consent is by targeting abusive trade practices. Sunstein and Thaler’s Nudge
is not a cookbook for manipulators, but it has been used as such, and the law
should step in to negate these practices. One of us has argued elsewhere that
rules against abusive trade practices and abusive design of information
technologies can help mitigate some of the inherent vulnerabilities of
control regimes.152
The notion of abusive design can be found in consumer protection law,
which aims to protect consumer choice. The most prominent prohibition on
abusive practices in the United States comes from the relatively new
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB). The Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act authorized the CFPB to
prohibit any “abusive” act or practice that:
(1) materially interferes with the ability of a consumer to understand
a term or condition of a consumer financial product or service; or

149. S. 3744, 115th Cong. (2018). (In full disclosure, we provided feedback on this bill in draft
form.)
150. See HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT, supra note 43, at 99.
151. The bill specifically provides that “The rights and remedies provided under this Act may not
be waived or limited by contract or otherwise.” S. 3744, 115th Cong. § 5 (2018).
152. HARTZOG, PRIVACY’S BLUEPRINT, supra note 43.
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(2) takes unreasonable advantage of—
(A) a lack of understanding on the part of the consumer of the
material risks, costs, or conditions of the product or service;
(B) the inability of the consumer to protect the interests of the
consumer in selecting or using a consumer financial product or
service; or
(C) the reasonable reliance by the consumer on a covered
person to act in the interests of the consumer.153
Rules against abusive trade practices look to the problems people have in
assessing risks and benefits even with accurate, truthful information. They
should begin with an internal inquiry into how we process information.154
Since the pathologies of consent are all related to our limitations in
processing information, this seems as good of a place as any for privacy
reform to begin with.
It’s time to take a bold step forward. America has an opportunity to
redefine itself as the country that protects the trust that people give to
companies. By embracing trust, America can become a leader on privacy
instead of following the path of false promises, diminishing returns, and the
tedium and vicious banality of mindless clicks of “I agree” buttons. Call it
legal innovation, if that’s what it takes. But whatever we call it, by requiring
that companies respect our trust, America can pave the way for a safe,
sustainable, and profitable digital future.
CONCLUSION
Tools are only fit for certain purposes. Legal tools are no different from
physical tools in this respect. Frederick Schauer once likened legal tools to
the problem of driving a nail into a board when you have a pipe wrench but
no hammer. Pipe wrenches are great for tightening or loosening pipes, but
153. 12 U.S.C.A. § 5531 (West 2019) (emphasis added).
154. Patrick M. Corrigan, "Abusive" Acts and Practices: Dodd-Frank's Behaviorally Informed
Authority over Consumer Credit Markets and Its Application to Teaser Rates, 18 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. &
PUB. POL'Y 125, 127 (2015) (“While shopping for the best offer, consumers may misperceive the real
costs and benefits of a consumer product or service because of a lack of information about the product
or service or due to a misunderstanding of the information available to them. The former is said to be a
problem of imperfect information, while the latter is said to be a problem of imperfect or bounded
rationality. Problems of imperfect information are extrinsic to the consumer, while problems of
imperfect rationality are intrinsic.”).

2019]

THE PATHOLOGIES OF DIGITAL CONSENT

1503

they make lousy hammers. You could certainly try to drive the nail into the
board with a pipe wrench, but you probably wouldn’t get it in straight, if
you get it in at all. And you’d probably damage the pipe wrench.155 Schauer
was talking about the First Amendment, but consent is a bit like a pipe
wrench as well—it is incredibly useful, even necessary, where it’s the right
tool for the job, but it can be easily overused, to the detriment of both the
task and the tool.
We have over-used the tool of consent to the point that it has become
badly damaged. Consent does and should play an essential role in our law,
but it cannot do everything well all the time. The over-use of consent in the
digital context, combined with limited legal policing of the sufficiency of
consent has allowed great fortunes to be created on the basis of personal
data, but it has also exposed consumers to data breaches, identity theft, and
a surveillance economy unprecedented in human history, one which
stretches the very notion of “consent” to say that it was ever actually agreed
to. More fundamentally, the manufacturing of consent by exploiting
consent’s pathologies has diminished the trust in our digital environment
that is the key ingredient toward a better future. We can do better, but in
order to do so, we need to recognize the pathologies of consent, and limit
consent to the contexts in which it is most justified. Going forward, we must
rely on strategies other than fictive, manufactured, or coerced consent to
minimize the risks and harms of our information economy, if we seek to
take advantage of its benefits in a sustainable, ethical, and progressive way.

155.

Frederick Schauer, First Amendment Opportunism, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH
(Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone eds., 2002).
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